The University of Maine

DigitalCommons@UMaine
Publications

Senator George J. Mitchell Center for Sustainability
Solutions

8-2015

Australians’ views on carbon pricing before and
after the 2013 federal election
Stacia J. Dreyer
University of Maine

Iain Walker
Shannon K. McCoy
University of Maine

Mario F. Teisl
University of Maine, teisl@maine.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/
mitchellcenter_pubs
Repository Citation
Dreyer, Stacia J.; Walker, Iain; McCoy, Shannon K.; and Teisl, Mario F., "Australians’ views on carbon pricing before and after the 2013
federal election" (2015). Publications. 14.
https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mitchellcenter_pubs/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been accepted for inclusion in Publications by an
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UMaine. For more information, please contact um.library.technical.services@maine.edu.

1
PUBLISHED ONLINE: 10 AUGUST 2015 |

Australians’ views on carbon pricing before and after
the 2013 federal election
Stacia J. Dreyer1,2*, Iain Walker3,4, Shannon K. McCoy2 and Mario F. Teisl1

1 School of Economics, University of Maine, Orono, Maine 04469, USA.
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As climate policies change through the legislative process, public attitudes towards them may change
as well. Therefore, it is important to assess how people accept and support controversial climate policies
as the policies change over time. Policy acceptance is a positive evaluation of, or attitude towards, an
existing policy1–3 ; policy support adds an active behavioural component1,3 . Acceptance does not necessarily
lead to support. We conducted a national survey of Australian residents to investigate acceptance of, and
support for, the Australian carbon pricing policy before and after the 2013 federal election, and how
perceptions of the policy, economic ideology, and voting behaviour affect acceptance and support. We found
acceptance and support were stable across the election period, which was surprising given that climate
policy was highly contentious during the election. Policy acceptance was higher than policy support at
both times and acceptance was a necessary but insufficient condition of support. We conclude that acceptance
is an important process through which perceptions of the policy and economic ideology influence support.
Therefore, future climate policy research needs to distinguish between acceptance and support to better
understand this process, and to better measure these concepts.

The acceptability of an environmental policy usually increases between planning and
implementation4–6 . This pattern is also evident in controversial health policies such as smoking
restrictions7 , but is not well established in the climate policy literature, where researchers have
measured acceptability, acceptance, and/or support for climate policies only at single time points1,8 .
Increased acceptance and support may be due to increased familiarity9,10 with the policy or the
realization that prior anxieties regarding perceived negative outcomes of the policy were unfulfilled4 .

The role elections play in changing policy support and acceptance is poorly understood. We
1

examined changes in support for, and acceptance of, Australia’s carbon pricing policy using data
collected a fortnight before and a fortnight after the 2013 federal election. The policy was a heated
topic of debate during the election campaign. Regardless of familiarity processes, changes in carbon
policy support and acceptance may reflect or drive changes in the government, but the literature
does not lend itself to any firm hypothesis. If the newly elected government had sought to overturn an
existing policy as part of its election platform, we may expect support and acceptance to diminish. If
the incumbent government, which had introduced the policy, were re-elected, we may expect
support and acceptance to increase. Many processes may account for such changes. People may
alter their views to align with newly discovered population norms11 , they may seek to resolve
cognitive dissonance arising from differences between their views and the new status quo12,13 , or
their views may become stronger because of greater perceived consensus for their own views11 .

Policy acceptability, acceptance and support have been used interchangeably within the
literature, but represent distinct constructs 1–3 . Disagreement also exists within the policy and
renewable energy technology (RET) literature regarding the definition of these constructs. Some
authors distinguish among these terms on an attitudinal/behavioural dimension 1–3,14 but, even so,
do not agree which terms correspond to attitudes and which to behaviours. Acceptability has been
said to correspond to attitudes and acceptance to behaviour14 ; conversely, acceptance to attitudes
and support to behaviours1–3 . Also, the terms have been distinguished temporally (that is, before
(acceptability) and after (acceptance) implementation), while being unaligned with the
attitudinal/behavioural dimension15 . Different types of RET acceptance have also been proposed—
socio-political acceptance, market acceptance, and community acceptance16 .

Research measuring acceptance and support as distinct constructs shows that levels of
2

acceptance are higher than support for the carbon policy in Australia 1 , fuel economy standards in
the United States3 , and energy infrastructure in the United Kingdom and Norway2 . However,
measurement concerns such as using a single item to measure the construct with different
response formats1 , or using the term ‘in favour of ’ as a proxy for support in a two-item measure2 ,
highlight the need for additional research.

Based on earlier work1 , we operationalize policy acceptance as a function of attitudes
towards a policy at a given time (after implementation), and policy support as a function of
acceptance with an additional behavioural component (action or intent). This conceptual
formulation can also be extended to RET and suggests that acceptance may be a precondition of
support. (Note that acceptability is also function of attitudes, but exists before policy
implementation.)

Perceived effectiveness and fairness have both been linked to the acceptability (acceptance)
of a proposed (implemented) environmental policy and support of a policy: greater perceived
fairness/effectiveness leads to greater acceptability, acceptance and/or support1,3,4,17 . Other
individual characteristics are important too. For example, free-market ideology (FMI) describes the
belief that markets should be allowed to operate unrestrained by government regulations; the
market will resolve any problems through supply and demand dynamics 18 . Individuals endorsing a
FMI are unlikely to accept or support climate policies 1,3 because these policies are governmental
regulations seeking to minimize negative market externalities (greenhouse gas emissions).

In Australia, climate action has been heatedly debated, with both Labor and Liberal
governments advancing and regressing action19–21 . The Clean Energy Legislative Package (CELP, also
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known as the carbon pricing policy, or inaccurately but more commonly as the carbon tax) was
enacted in July 2012 by the Labor-led Australian federal government. The government sought to hold
about 500 large industries responsible for the emissions they release by introducing a carbon price
which would, in time, function as an emissions trading scheme (ETS) tied to the European Union’s
ETS. The government also created a compensation package for households indirectly impacted by
the carbon price. At the time of policy implementation, the Opposition coalition strongly opposed
the policy, instead favouring other measures such as market incentives. However, in the past years,
leaders of the Liberal party (that is, Tirnbull, Howard) have supported an ETS (refs 19-21).

In June 2013, Kevin Rudd replaces Julia Gilard as leader of the Labor Party, thus becoming
Prime Minister, and announced plans to fast forward the ETS, owing to high living costs 19. The ETS
was linked to the European Union’s ETS one year earlier than planned, creating a floating marketbased price for carbon, instead of a fixed price. The CELP and associated ETS was later repealed in
July 2014, after the conservation Liberal-National Party coalition won government in the September
2013 federal election, and Tony Abbot became the new Prime Minister. A new Direct Action Plan
was enacted, in which an Emissions Reduction Fund provides incentives for abatement activities 22.

We investigated whether the 2013 Australian federal election affected levels of acceptance
and support for the Australian carbon policy. The carbon Policy was a key election issue, with
different carbon policy outcomes depending on the election results. We measured acceptance and
support of the carbon policy two weeks before (Time 1-T1 and two weeks after (Time 2-T2) the
election through an online questionnaire distributed to a national sample of the Australian
residents. We tested the following hypotheses: acceptance will be higher than support; acceptance
and support will change between T1 and T2; and acceptance is necessary precondition of support
4

(as one must accept a policy to support it).

At both T1 and T2, policy acceptance was significantly higher than support (T1: t(515)=9.68,
p<0.001; T2: t(515)=11.64, p< 0.001) and, surprisingly, acceptance and support were unchanged by
the election (repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA); acceptance: F(1,515)=1.44, p> 0.10,
support: F(1,515)=0.01, p> 0.10; see Table 1). Although acceptance and support levels varied
predictably with the political party voted for, the basic findings of higher levels of acceptance than
support and lack of change over time were consistent across party choice (see Table 1 and Methods
for complete analysis).

Using hierarchical multiple regression analyses for T2 respondents (N=785), we tested
whether perceived effectiveness, perceived fairness and FMI (all centred at the mean; entered on
Step 1) and the interactions among these variables (entered on Step 2) predicted policy acceptance
or support (see Table 2 and Methods for information on covariates, which did not impact the
regression). Only the main effects were significant in these models (Acceptance: Step 1 adjusted
R2=0.77, F(3,781)=873.65, p < 0.001; Support: Step 1 adjusted R2=0.69, F(3,781)=571.03, p < 0.001).
As predicted, greater perceived fairness and effectiveness were associated with increased
acceptance and support of the policy, whereas greater FMI was and support of the policy (see Table
2). The addition of the interaction terms on Step 2 of these analyses failed to increase the
2
2
amount of variance explained in either model (Δ𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑐
= 0.00, Δ𝑅𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝
= 0.00; although one

interaction term (fairness * effectiveness) in the support model was significant, it failed to
significantly increase the variance explained).

To examine our hypothesis that acceptance is a necessary precondition for support, we first
5

cross-tabulated the distributions of acceptance and support among all participants at T2 (Methods
and Supplementary Table 1; see Batel et al. 2013, for a similar analytic strategy, applied to a
different context). For most respondents, acceptance and support aligned (accepting and
supporting (33.2%); not accepting and not supporting (21.4%) or neutral on both (29%)). In our
sample, 2.8% of respondents accepted, but did not support the policy. Only 0.4% supported the
policy but did not accept it. Starker evidence comes from comparing the proportion of those who
accepted the policy from among those who supported it (92.2%) and the proportion of those who
supported the policy from among those who accepted it (71.7%). These comparisons suggest
acceptance is a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for policy support—again highlighting
these are two separate constructs.

A cross-lagged correlation analysis23 bolsters this conclusion: there was a significant difference
between the correlation of acceptance at T1 with support at T2 (controlling for support at T1) and
support at T1 and acceptance at T2 (controlling for acceptance at T1; r ’s=0.32 and 0.17 respectively;
z=2.10, p< 0.05), suggesting acceptance precedes support (see Methods for details).

We further tested whether acceptance is a necessary precondition of support with a mediation
analysis using AMOS with bootstrap estimation of the indirect effects (5,000 samples) among all
respondents at T2. As shown in Fig. 1, we specified acceptance as the mediator and support as the
dependent variable, with fairness, effectiveness and FMI as correlated predictors. Initial model
testing revealed a better model fit constraining the direct path from FMI to support to 0, therefore
−

this path was omitted from the final model. Results indicated a good model fit, accounting for
77% of the variance in support(𝑋 2 (1) = 1.11, 𝑝 = 0.29; comparative fit index (CFI)=1.00, root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)=0.01 (CI:0.00, 0.10); standardized root mean square
6

residual (SRMR)=0.004). Acceptance was a significant mediator of all three predictors, as the 95%
bias-corrected confidence intervals (CIs) for the indirect effect did not contain 0 (FMI: -0.09, CI: -0.20,
-0.10; fairness: 0.26, CI: 0.21, 0.33; effectiveness: 0.28, CI:0.22,0.34). An alternative model
transposing acceptance and support did not fit the data as well (χ2(1)=35.33, p=0.00; CFI=0.98,
RMSEA=0.21 (CI: 0.15, 0.27); SRMR=0.02), thus the current model is preferred. This suggests that
acceptance is an important process through which FMI, fairness and effectiveness influence
support. Fairness and effectiveness maintained significant, positive, direct effects in the presence of
acceptance, whereas FMI did not.
Society-wide actions on climate change require broad acceptance and support of government
policies and interventions. Our analyses offer novel evidence to conclude that acceptance is a
necessary but not sufficient precondition of support, generally stronger than sup- port (support
adding behavioural elements), and an important process through which FMI, fairness and
effectiveness influence support. Together, this reinforces earlier results highlighting the necessity of
measuring acceptance and support as distinct constructs 1-3, while eliminating past measurement
concerns (through measuring multiple items for each construct on similar response scales).

Although we have identified one important process, there may be others, not measured here,
that should be explored. To do so, future climate policy research needs to measure acceptance and
support as distinct constructs while investigating other variables. Furthermore, those who do not
support the policy do not necessarily oppose it. Future research should attempt to disentangle
opposition from lack of support, ambivalence from apathy, and ‘rejection’ from ‘resistance’24.

Our second major conclusion relates to the stability of acceptance and support for Australia’s
proposed carbon pricing policy during a significant electoral upheaval where climate policy was an
7

important area of contention. The lack of change was independent of party choice. Possibly, the
stability of acceptance and support are related to the ambiguity around policy alternatives.
Participants at T2 may have known that Abbott would try to repeal the CELP and institute the
Direct Action Plan, but they would not have known the specifics of the alternative, as they were not
released until after the survey.

Evaluation of the acceptance or support of a current policy should happen in a comparative
policy context rather than in isolation from competing policy options. A limitation of our study is
that we were unable to assess support and acceptability of the Direct Action Plan, and its perceived
fairness and effectiveness, as the policy details were unknown at the time of the study and hence
could not be included. The more fair and effective a policy is perceived to be, the more likely it is
to be accepted and supported, therefore participation and/or procedural justice (a type of
fairness) may be a key concern25,26 for future climate action. Research in many sustainability
domains has considered the important role of participation, such as in planning and decisionmaking in renewable energy technology24 , for sustainability science and community-based
participatory research27 , and in the implementation of European climate targets28 . The CELP
was specifically designed to address distributive justice issues via the household compensation
plan; as such, we measured the distributive justice aspects of fairness in our study. Future
studies should address participation and procedural justice concerns, if they are applicable for
the climate policy.

Some policy-implementation implications arising from our study include the importance of
ensuring public acceptance to undergird support. This can be done by, for example,
communicating normative information29,30 —in Australia, the carbon pricing legislation was not as
8

unpopular as many, especially on the conservative side of Australian politics claimed, with nearly
half of the population finding the policy acceptable and providing further evidence of pluralistic
ignorance11 . However, that level of acceptance did not translate into effective support through the
election. Clearly, policy acceptance does not equate to support (although it does mediate it),
especially in contested arenas such as elections, where many issues are conflated into a single
electoral point.

Methods

We used a within-subjects online survey experiment to investigate changes in support and
acceptance before (T1) and after (T2) the 2013 federal election with Australian adults representing
metropolitan, regional and rural areas online. Participants were recruited from a research-only panel
administered by the research company ORU (http://www.theoru.com). ORU is an online fieldwork
company with QSOAP Gold Standard and new global ISO 26363 standard accreditations. Through multisource and multichannel recruiting, ORU has a database of more than 300,000 individuals from across
Australia. Participants were entered into a prize draw as an incentive to complete the survey. T1
surveying occurred approximately two weeks before the election in August 2013, and T2 occurred
approximately two weeks after the election. Only T1 participants willing to be contacted at T2 were
retained for data analysis (N=772, 384 males, 388 females). The T1 (T2) survey was open for six (seven)
days before we reached the desired minimum sample size of 750.

In addition, we used between-subjects design to measure testing bias. Testing bias was assessed to
ensure that participating in the survey before the election did not influence the responses of those same
participants (within-subjects) after the election. Post-election results from an independent sample taken
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at T2 were compared against the within-subjects sample at T2 and no significant differences were found
on measures of acceptance or support (p’s > 0.05), indicating there were no testing effects for our
online survey.

For T1, we sent 14,500 invites via email within the panel. Of these, 1,551 respondents clicked the
link from their computers, resulting in a 48.8% cooperation rate, and 5.3% response rate. For T2 we recontacted the 772 T1 participants and recruited new participants. At T2, N=785 (388 males, 397
females); 516 were T1 participants and 269 were new participants. There was a 72.6% cooperation rate;
66.8% response rate within the T1 sample (772 invites sent, 711 click-ins), and a 55% cooperation rate;
5.7% response rate for those who were new at T2 (4,700 invites sent, 489 click-ins).
Questionnaires differed slightly for T1 and T2, reflecting prior consent and the recent change in
government. Our measures are described below (see Supplementary Information for questionnaire). Our
method is, in part, based on past work1 , but improves on certain limitations by utilizing the same
response format to measure multiple items for acceptance and support. In addition, our analytical
approach differs from that past work. Unless noted, items were measured on five-point response scales.

Free-market ideology (FMI).

We measured FMI using the FMI scale in ref. 18 (see Supplementary Information), presenting items in
random order to each participant. Responses were coded so a higher score aligned with endorsement of
a FMI.

10

Policy acceptance and support.

To ensure participants had a basic policy knowledge, the survey included a brief summary of the
carbon policy taken from the government website. Next, acceptance and support items were randomly
presented to each participant, along with the fairness and effectiveness items. The acronym CELP is used
here for brevity, but was spelt out within questionnaire items.

We measured acceptance with four statements: ‘How acceptable do you find the CELP?’, ‘To what
extent are you in favour for or against the CELP?’, ‘To what extent do you agree or disagree with the
implementation of the CELP?’ and ‘Do you prefer having the current carbon policy in place, as opposed
to no carbon policy?’. Scores were averaged; higher numbers indicate greater acceptance (T1: α =
0.95; T2: α = 0.95).
Support was measured with three statements: ‘How supportive are you of the carbon policy (The
CELP)?’, ‘How willing are you to bear some of the costs resulting from the implementation of the CELP?’,
‘How willing are you to take action to voice a positive opinion about the CELP, such as writing a letter or
calling a representative?’. Scores were averaged; higher numbers indicate greater support (T1: α = 0.79;
T2: α = 0.82).

Perceived fairness and effectiveness.

Perceived fairness and effectiveness were each measured by two items: ‘How fair do you think it is
that some big industries now must pay for the carbon they emit, as mandated by the carbon pricing
11

policy?’, How fair do you think the compensation plan is for those affected by increased costs due to the
carbon price?’, ‘How effective do you think the carbon pricing policy will be to help lower carbon
emissions from industries in Australia?’, ‘How effective do you think the compensation plan is in
reducing the financial impact of the carbon price on individuals?’. The two items for each measure were
strongly correlated with each other (T1: reff=0.65, rfair=0.54; T2: reff=0.65, rfair=0.49; p’s < 0.01), supporting
our decision to take the average of the two items as our measures of fairness and effectiveness.
Higher numbers indicate greater fairness/effectiveness.

Voting preferences and behaviour.

At T1 we asked ‘Which political party are you most likely to vote for in the next federal election?’;
and at T2 ‘In the recent federal election for the House of Representatives, which of the following did you
vote for?’ and ‘To which party did you give your second preference ?’. Response categories were: Labor
Party, Liberal Party. National Party. Green Party, Independent, Family First, Other, Prefer not to say.
Additionally, there was an ‘I don’t know’ category at T1.

Demographics.

We assessed gender, income, age and education. Six response categories were included for
income, varying from ‘0–$18,200’ to ‘$180,001 and over.’ These categories were chosen to replicate
the cutoff points for the compensation package within the carbon policy, based on household
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incomes established by the Australian Government. Additionally, we included a ‘prefer not to
respond’ category.

Acceptance and support.

During both time periods, policy acceptance was higher than support. Of the 516 participants
who completed both surveys, 46.3% found the policy acceptable, 28.1% unacceptable, and 25.6%
were neutral or ambivalent at T1. In contrast, 35.9% supported the policy, 33.5% did not support the
policy, and 30.6% were neutral or ambivalent. At T2, 45.7% found the policy acceptable, 25.4%
unacceptable, and 28.9% were neutral or ambivalent. In contrast, 36.4% supported the policy, 33.3%
did not support the policy, and 30.2% were neutral or ambivalent. These findings were further
supported by significant mean differences between acceptance and support for both time periods
(Table 1). As hypothesized, participants showed greater acceptance than support of the policy at T1
(t(515)=9.68, p< 0.001) and T2 (t(515)=11.64, p< 0.001). Both acceptance and support were stable
across the election time: a repeated-measures ANOVA showed no significant change in acceptance or
support from T1 to T2, (p’s > 0.05).

Covariates.

Preliminary regression analyses for covariates revealed that age and gender were not
significantly related to support or acceptance—and were therefore dropped from subsequent
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analyses. Education and income were significant predictors of acceptance (b=0.14, p< 0.01; b= -0.11,
p< 0.05) and education was a significant predictor of support (b=0.19, p< 0.01). As the inclusion of
these variables did not affect the significance of other variables within the hierarchical multiple
regression models, they were removed from the models for sake of parsimony and comparability. In
addition, education and income were analysed for repeated-measures effects, to see if the covariates
influenced changes in acceptance or support over time. No covariate significantly impacted the
relationship of acceptance or support over time. Therefore, the covariates were excluded from
analysis of variance procedures.

Analysis of variance by voting.

Political party voting intention at T1 was closely split between the Labor Party (n= 148, 28.7%)
and the Liberal Party (n=146, 28.3%), with the remainder spread among smaller parties. At T2, selfreported first preference votes (the political party to which the participants gave their first vote to)
were equally split between the Labor Party (n=164) and the Liberal Party (n=165), with other parties in
smaller quantities (Table 1).

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to see whether supporters of different political
parties significantly differed in carbon policy acceptance and support. This analysis included only
Labor, Liberal and Greens Party supporters owing to small cell sizes of other categories and lack of
comparability for ‘prefer not to say’ or ‘other.’ The analyses revealed significant main effects for
voting behaviour on acceptance and support and both T1 and T2 (Acceptance: F(2,373) = 79.99,
14

p< 0.001; F(2,373) = 73.46, p< 0.001, respectively; Support: F(2,373) = 66.81, p<0.001;
F(2,373)=57.68, p<0.001, respectively). Tukey's HSD tests showed significant differences between
Greens and Liberal supporters, and Liberal and Labor supporters at T1 and T2, as well as Greens and
Labor at T2, but only for support (p's<0.05) (Table 1). Highest levels of acceptance and support of
the carbon policy occurred in Greens Party supporters at both T1 and T2, whereas Liberal Party
supporters reported the lowest levels of acceptance and support. Paired samples t-tests indicated
no changes in acceptance or support from T1 to T2 for Labor, Liberal or Greens supporters
(p's<0.05).

Cross-lagged correlations.

Owing to high zero-order correlation between the acceptance and support at both time periods,
we computed cross-lagged correlations on the residuals23,31. In effect, we used the correlation
between acceptance at T1 with support at T2, while controlling for support at T1 (racc1supp2.supp1 ) and
the correlation between support at T1 and acceptance at T2, while controlling for acceptance at T1
(rsupp1acc2.acc1 ), along with the two synchronous correlations of the residuals (racc1supp1 and racc2supp2 ),
and the two autocorrelations of the residuals (racc1acc2 and rsupp1supp2 ) to test the equality of the
23

cross-lagged correlations using our within-subjects sample (N 516). We find that the cross-lagged
correlations of the residuals are significantly different from each other (racc1supp2.supp1 =0.32,
rsupp1acc2.acc1=0.17, z=2.10, p< 0.05; ref. 32), giving further evidence supporting the argument hat
acceptance of a policy is a precondition for support (that is, indicates causality).
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Figure 1 Path model. This model shows acceptance mediating the effects of FMI, effectiveness and
fairness with standardized regression estimates. The curved lines indicate covariance and associated
correlation. All paths are significant, p’s<0.01.
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